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SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
The Women’s Health Amendment to the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) mandated that women’s health insurance 
include coverage for preventive health care.  Through the 
Amendment, Congress directed the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (“HRSA”), a component of the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), to issue 
guidelines setting forth the preventive health care services that 
women should be provided.  Among the services HRSA 
identified was contraceptive care.  Nowhere in the enabling 
statute did Congress grant the agency the authority to exempt 
entities from providing insurance coverage for such services 
nor did Congress allow federal agencies to issue regulations 
concerning this coverage without complying with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.   
 
Notwithstanding Congress’s directives, in 2017, HHS 
and the Departments of Labor and Treasury (collectively, “the 
Agencies”) promulgated regulations that expanded the entities 
that could invoke an exemption to the requirement that group 
health insurance plans cover contraceptive services as a form 
of women’s preventive health care.  Because the state plaintiffs 
are likely to succeed in proving that the Agencies did not 
follow the APA and that the regulations are not authorized 
under the ACA or required by the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), we will affirm the District Court’s 
order preliminarily enjoining the rules’ enforcement 
nationwide.  
 
 
I 
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A 
 
 Enacted as a part of the ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), the Women’s Health Amendment mandates 
that “[a] group health plan[1] and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance coverage shall, at 
a minimum provide coverage for and shall not impose any cost 
sharing requirements for . . . preventive care and screenings 
[for women] . . . as provided for in comprehensive guidelines 
supported by the [HRSA].”2  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a), (a)(4).  
HRSA commissioned an expert panel from the Institute of 
Medicine to recommend covered services.  In 2011, HRSA 
adopted the Institute’s recommendations and issued guidelines 
defining preventive care to include all “Food and Drug 
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for all 
women with reproductive capacity,” “as prescribed” by a 
woman’s health care provider.  HRSA, Women’s Preventive 
Services Guidelines, https://www.hrsa.gov/womens-
guidelines/index.html (last visited May 8, 2019).  This 
                                              
1 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300bb-8(1), the term “group 
health plan” has the meaning set forth in 26 U.S.C. 
§ 5000(b)(1), which defines a “group health plan” as “a plan 
(including a self-insured plan) of, or contributed to by, an 
employer . . . to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to 
the employees.”  
2 Congress expressly exempted two sets of actors from 
various ACA requirements, including the Women’s Health 
Amendment: grandfathered health plans, 42 U.S.C. § 18011, 
and employers with fewer than 50 employees, 26 U.S.C. 
§ 4980H(c)(2).  
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statutory and regulatory scheme was deemed the 
“Contraceptive Mandate.”  Several regulations and litigation 
followed.  
 
1 
 
 The same day that the Guidelines were issued, the 
Agencies promulgated an interim final rule (“IFR”), followed 
by a final rule in 2013, to exempt certain religious employers—
namely, churches and similar entities—from the Contraceptive 
Mandate.  Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers 
Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient 
Protection Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8,725 (Feb. 15, 
2012) (the “Church Exemption”); Group Health Plans and 
Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
76 Fed. Reg. 46,621 (Aug. 3, 2011).3  As the Agencies later 
                                              
3 After a notice-and-comment rulemaking process, 
which included consideration of comments concerning 
whether coverage may conflict with the religious beliefs of 
some employers, Group Health Plans and Health Insurance 
Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 
46,621, 46,623 (August 3, 2011), the Agencies defined 
“religious employer[s]” in the Church Exemption as entities 
“that [are] organized and operate[] as . . . nonprofit entit[ies] 
and [are] referred to” as such in the internal revenue code 
provision applying to “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
and conventions or associations of churches, as well as to the 
exclusively religious activities of any religious order,” 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
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explained, the “exemption for churches and houses of worship 
is consistent with their special status under longstanding 
tradition in our society and under federal law.”  Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 
Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,325 (July 14, 2015). 
 
The 2013 final rule also separately provided that a 
nonprofit religious employer who “(1) [o]pposes providing 
coverage for some or all of the contraceptive services required 
to be covered . . . on account of religious objections; (2) is 
organized and operates as a nonprofit entity; (3) holds itself out 
as a religious organization; and (4) self-certifies that it satisfies 
the first three criteria,” 78 Fed. Reg. at 39,874, is entitled to an 
accommodation to avoid “contracting, arranging, paying, or 
referring for contraceptive coverage,” id. at 39,875.  This 
accommodation process (the “Accommodation”) permits an 
employer to send a self-certification form to its insurance 
issuer, which then excludes contraceptive coverage, either in 
full or in part, from the group health plan and in turn 
“provide[s] payments for contraceptive services for plan 
participants and beneficiaries, separate from the group health 
plan, without the imposition of cost sharing, premium, fee, or 
other charge on plan participants or beneficiaries or on the 
eligible organization or its plan.”  Id. at 39,876.  A third party 
administrator (“TPA”) may also be used as a claims or plan 
administrator “solely for the purpose of providing payments 
for contraceptive services for participants and beneficiaries in 
a self-insured plan of an eligible organization at no cost to plan 
participants or beneficiaries or to the eligible organization.”  Id. 
at 39,879.  By invoking the Accommodation, the employer was 
                                              
Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,871, 39,889 
(July 2, 2013); see 45 C.F.R. § 147.132. 
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no longer responsible for providing coverage for contraceptive 
care.  
 
2 
 
Various legal challenges followed.  First, in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014), the Supreme 
Court held that the Accommodation must be extended to 
closely-held for-profit corporations with sincere religious 
objections to the provision of contraceptive coverage so that 
their religious beliefs were not substantially burdened under 
RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.  Id. at 724-26.  The Court 
observed that use of the Accommodation process was a less 
restrictive means to ensure access to cost-free contraceptives.  
Id. at 730-31.  Days later, in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 
U.S. 958 (2014), the Court concluded that Wheaton College, 
who also lodged a religious objection to providing insurance 
for services covered by the Contraceptive Mandate, did not 
have to use the Accommodation self-certification form, known 
as the ESBA Form 700, but could instead rely on its 
notification to HHS to satisfy the Accommodation’s 
prerequisites.  Id. at 959.   
 
To ensure compliance with these rulings, the Agencies 
promulgated another IFR and final rule.4  Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 41,318 (July 14, 2015).  The rule “extend[ed] the 
[A]ccommodation to a for-profit entity that is not publicly 
                                              
4 The final rule implementing Hobby Lobby was 
preceded by notice of proposed rulemaking.  Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
79 Fed. Reg. 51,118 (Aug. 27, 2014).   
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traded, is majority-owned by a relatively small number of 
individuals, and objects to providing contraceptive coverage 
based on its owners’ religious beliefs.”  Id. at 41,324.  The rule 
also “allow[ed] eligible organizations to choose between using 
[the] ESBA Form 700 or the alternative process [of notifying 
HHS in writing of a religious objection to covering 
contraceptive services] consistent with the Wheaton interim 
order.”  Id. at 41,323.  
 
In Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per 
curiam), the Supreme Court addressed the petitioners’ 
assertions that “submitting [the Accommodation] notice 
substantially burden[ed] the exercise of their religion, in 
violation of [RFRA].”  Id. at 1559.  The Court did not reach the 
merits of this claim but rather remanded to afford the parties 
“an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that 
accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same 
time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 
receive full . . . contraceptive coverage.”  Id. at 1560 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
In response to the Court’s direction in Zubik, the 
Agencies solicited comments regarding the current procedure 
and possible alternatives to the Accommodation.  Coverage for 
Contraceptive Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,741 (July 22, 2016).  
The Agencies reviewed the comments and found that “no 
feasible approach has been identified at this time that would 
resolve the concerns of religious objectors while still ensuring 
that the affected women receive full and equal health coverage, 
including contraceptive coverage.”  Dep’t of Labor, FAQs 
About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36, at 4 (Jan. 
9, 2017), available at 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-
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activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-part-36.pdf.  As a result, the 
Accommodation remained unchanged.  
 
3 
 
In May 2017, President Donald Trump issued an 
executive order directing the Agencies to “consider issuing 
amended regulations, consistent with applicable law, to 
address conscience-based objections to the preventive-care 
mandate promulgated under [42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4)].”   
Exec. Order No. 13,798 § 3, 82 Fed. Reg. 21,675 (May 9, 
2017).  In response, and without issuing a notice of proposed 
rulemaking or soliciting public comment, the Agencies issued 
two new IFRs: the Religious IFR and the Moral IFR.  These 
IFRs expanded the existing exemption and Accommodation 
framework, made the Accommodation process voluntary, and 
offered similar protections to organizations with moral 
objections to contraceptives.  See Religious Exemptions and 
Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 
2017); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage 
of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 
82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017).  This litigation followed.  
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B 
 
1 
 
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed suit against 
various governmental entities5 and sought to enjoin the 
enforcement of the IFRs.  Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter 
and Paul Home (“Little Sisters”) intervened.6  The District 
                                              
5 These entities include the President, the Agencies and 
their Secretaries, and the United States of America 
(collectively, “the Government”).  
6 Little Sisters, a religious nonprofit operating a home 
in Pittsburgh, moved to intervene, the District Court denied 
its motion, and our Court reversed, concluding, at that time, 
intervention was appropriate because the litigation posed a 
threat to Little Sisters’ interest in an exemption, and that its 
interests are not adequately represented by the Government.  
See generally Pennsylvania v. President of the United States 
of Am., 888 F.3d 52 (3d Cir. 2018).  Since then, however, the 
United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
permanently enjoined enforcement of the Contraceptive 
Mandate for benefit plans in which Little Sisters participates.  
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 829 n.27 (E.D. 
Pa. 2019) (“Defendant-Intervenor has secured a permanent 
injunction, preventing enforcement of the Contraceptive 
Mandate against it.”); Little Sisters of the Poor v. Azar, No. 
1:13-cv-02611, Dkt. No. 82 at 2-3 (D. Colo. May 29, 2018); 
Accordingly, Little Sisters is no longer aggrieved by the 
District Court’s ruling, its need for relief is moot, and thus 
they lack appellate standing.  See Ass’n of Banks in Ins. v. 
Duryee, 270 F.3d 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he intervenor-
defendants face the threat of economic injury should the Ohio 
18 
 
Court granted Pennsylvania’s request to preliminarily enjoin 
the IFRs.  See generally Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 
3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017).  The Court held that Pennsylvania was 
likely to succeed on its procedural and substantive challenges 
under the APA.  Id. at 576, 581.  The Government appealed, 
and the District Court granted a stay pending appeal.  
 
While the appeal of the order preliminarily enjoining 
the IFRs was pending, the Agencies promulgated two Final 
Rules, which are virtually identical to the Religious and Moral 
IFRs.  See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable 
Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018); 45 C.F.R. 
§ 147.132 (“Religious Rule” or “Religious Exemption”); 
Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 
Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018); 45 C.F.R. § 147.133 
(“Moral Rule” or “Moral Exemption”) (collectively, “the 
Rules” or “the Exemptions”).  Like the Religious IFR, the Final 
Rule creating the Religious Exemption expanded the 
categories of employers who are permitted to invoke the 
exemption from the Contraceptive Mandate to include all 
nonprofit, for-profit, and publicly-held companies.  The 
Religious Exemption also made participation in the 
                                              
statutory provisions not be enforced. Such threatened injury is 
sufficient to confer appellate standing on the intervenor-
defendants and allows them to challenge the merits of the 
district court’s decision.”); cf. In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 
1066, 1071 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Since both intervenors remain 
aggrieved after the district court’s disposition, the 
constitutional requirements for standing to appeal as well as 
standing to sue are satisfied.”). 
19 
 
Accommodation process completely voluntarily, relieving 
employers from the need to “file notices or certifications of 
their exemption.”7  83 Fed. Reg. at 57,558; see also id. at 
57,537, 57,562.  The Final Rule creating the Moral Exemption 
offered the same exemption and voluntary accommodation 
process to nonprofit organizations and non-publicly traded 
organizations “with sincerely held moral convictions opposed 
to coverage of some or all contraceptive or sterilization 
methods.”  Id. at 57,593.   
 
At Pennsylvania’s request, the District Court lifted the 
stay, and Pennsylvania filed an amended complaint, joined 
New Jersey as a plaintiff,8 added challenges to the Final Rules 
and moved to enjoin them.9  
                                              
7 The Agencies assert that under ERISA, employees 
will at least receive notice that their plans no longer cover 
certain contraceptives because, “with respect to plans subject 
to ERISA, a plan document must include a comprehensive 
summary of the benefits covered by the plan,” which will 
“serve to help provide notice to participants and 
beneficiaries” of what services are covered.  83 Fed. Reg. at 
57,558.  Even if this is true, this would apply only to certain 
employers.  
8 Pennsylvania and New Jersey are referred to herein 
collectively as the “the States.” 
9 The States’ amended complaint for declaratory and 
injunctive relief pleads five counts: (I) violation of Equal 
Protection of the laws under the Fifth Amendment; 
(II) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act; (III) violation of the 
procedural requirements of the APA; (IV) violation of the 
20 
 
2 
 
 The District Court held hearings and received evidence 
regarding the Rules.  Specifically, the States submitted 
evidence from health care professionals and state insurance 
regulators about the Rules’ impact.  The evidence addressed 
the relationship between costs and contraceptive use and the 
impact the Rules would have on state-funded healthcare 
services. 
 
 Cost is a significant barrier to contraceptive use and 
access.  The most effective forms of contraceptives are the 
most expensive.  After the ACA removed cost barriers, women 
switched to the more effective and expensive methods of 
contraception.10  Because the Rules allow employers to opt out 
of providing coverage for contraceptive services, some women 
may no longer have insurance to help offset the cost for these 
and other contraceptives. 
 
 Pennsylvania and New Jersey have state-funded 
programs that provide family planning and contraceptive 
services for eligible individuals.  For example, Pennsylvania 
                                              
substantive requirements of the APA; and (V) violation of the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.    
10 Before the ACA, women spent between 30 and 40% 
of their total out-of-pocket health costs on contraceptives, and 
55% of women experienced a time where they could not 
afford contraceptives.  Amicus Curiae Women’s Law Ctr. Br. 
at 15-17; id. at 17 (describing that the ACA dropped out-of-
pocket contraceptive expenditures by 70%).   
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Medicaid and New Jersey’s FamilyCare11 cover all health care 
for childless adults, pregnant women, and parents with 
incomes up to 138% and up to 215% of the federal poverty 
level, respectively.  Pennsylvania’s Family Planning Services 
Program also covers all family planning-related services, 
including contraceptives, for individuals with incomes up to 
215% of the federal poverty level even if they have private 
insurance, and New Jersey’s Plan First program offers the 
same for individuals with incomes up to 205% of the federal 
poverty level.     
 
 Women who lack contraceptive coverage and who meet 
certain income levels may also turn to Title X family planning 
clinics which “provide access to contraceptive services, 
supplies, and information to all who want and need them” with  
priority to low-income persons.  Office of Population Affairs, 
Funding History, HHS, https://www.hhs.gov/opa/title-x-
family-planning/about-title-x-grants/funding-
history/index.html (last visited May 12, 2019).  State and 
federal governments fund Title X clinics, but recently, federal 
funding has decreased.    
 
The States expect that when women lose contraceptive 
insurance coverage from their employers, they will seek out 
these state-funded programs and services.  The States further 
assert that women who do not seek or qualify for state-funded 
contraceptives may have unintended pregnancies.  Public 
funds are used to cover the costs of many unintended 
                                              
11 NJ FamilyCare is New Jersey’s state and federally-
funded Medicaid.   
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pregnancies.12  Accordingly, the States expect to spend more 
money due to the Rules.    
 
 In addition to this evidence, the Agencies presented 
spread sheets that listed the organizations and companies that 
were previously involved in ACA Contraceptive Mandate 
litigation.  The Agencies offered this evidence to demonstrate 
the likely universe of employers whom they contend may seek 
to invoke the Rules and opt out of covering contraceptive care. 
 
3 
 
The day the Final Rules were set to go into effect, 
January 14, 2019, the District Court issued a nationwide 
injunction enjoining their enforcement.  Pennsylvania v. 
Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791 (E.D. Pa. 2019).  The Court found 
that the States had standing to challenge the Final Rules and 
established a likelihood of success on the merits of their APA 
claims.  First, the Court held that the States are likely to 
succeed on their procedural APA claims because the Agencies 
failed to comply with the notice-and-comment requirement and 
this defect tainted the Final Rules.  Id. at 813.  Second, the 
Court held that the States were likely to succeed on their 
substantive APA challenges because neither the ACA nor 
RFRA authorized the Agencies to create exemptions.  
Specifically, the unambiguous language of the ACA’s 
Women’s Health Amendment only authorized the Agencies to 
decide what services would be covered, not who provides 
                                              
12 Nationally, a publicly-funded birth in 2010 cost 
$12,770, and that year, New Jersey spent an estimated $186.1 
million on unintended pregnancies and Pennsylvania an 
estimated $248.2 million.   
23 
 
them, id. at 821, and RFRA did not require or authorize such 
broad exemptions, particularly given RFRA’s remedial 
function that places the responsibility for adjudicating religious 
burdens on the courts, not the Agencies, id. at 822-23.  The 
Court concluded that the balance of equities and public interest 
favored an injunction, id. at 829-30, and that a nationwide 
injunction was appropriate to ensure complete relief for the 
States, id. at 834-35.  The Government appeals. 
 
II13 
 
We first address whether the States have standing.14  
Article III limits the scope of federal judicial review to “cases” 
or “controversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III § 2.  A fundamental 
safeguard of this limitation is the doctrine of standing.  Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  Put simply, only 
parties with standing “can invoke the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts.”  Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 
357 (3d Cir. 2014).  To have standing to sue, “[t]he plaintiff 
must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly 
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) 
that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”  
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)).  We will examine each 
element in turn.   
                                              
13 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).   
14 “We review the legal conclusions related to standing 
de novo, but review for clear error the factual elements 
underlying the District Court’s determination of standing.”  
Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 414 
(3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
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A 
 
To establish injury in fact, the alleged injury must be 
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”  Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560).  An injury is concrete if it “actually exist[s]” and 
is not abstract.  Id.  “For an injury to be particularized, it must 
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individualized way.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Plaintiffs 
need not “demonstrate that it is literally certain that the harms 
they identify will come about.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).  Instead, “[a]n allegation of 
future injury may suffice if . . . there is a substantial risk that 
the harm will occur.”  Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 
U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 410 (rejecting lower 
court’s use of an “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard 
to assess injury).   
 
1 
 
The States have established that they will suffer a 
concrete and particularized injury.  The States describe that 
(1) employers will take advantage of the exemptions and 
women covered by their plans will lose contraceptive 
coverage; and (2) financially- eligible women will turn to state-
funded services for their contraceptive needs and for the 
unintended pregnancies that may result from the loss of 
coverage.  As a result, the States will suffer a concrete financial 
injury from the increased use of state-funded services.   See 
Cottrell v. Alcon Labs., 874 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“Typically, a plaintiff’s allegations of financial harm will 
easily satisfy each of these components, as financial harm is a 
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classic and paradigmatic form[ ] of injury in fact.” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).  
The States will suffer this injury in a particularized manner, as 
each State’s coffers will be depleted by the expenditure of 
funds to meet the increased demand for state services.  Having 
concluded that the States have identified a concrete and 
particular injury, we next examine whether the injury at issue 
is not conjectural and is actual or imminent.   
 
The record shows that the injury the States expect to 
sustain is not conjectural.  First, the Agencies’ regulatory 
impact analysis acknowledges that between 70,500 and 
126,400 women nationwide will lose contraceptive coverage 
as a result of their employers’ invocation of the Religious 
Exemption, 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,578, 57,581, and fifteen women 
will lose coverage as a result of their employers’ use of the 
Moral Exemption, 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,627.  See California v. 
Azar (“California II”), 911 F.3d 558, 572 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(noting that the Agencies’ own regulatory impact analysis 
estimates loss of coverage, and therefore “it is reasonably 
probable that women in the plaintiff states will lose some or all 
employer-sponsored contraceptive coverage due to the IFRs”), 
cert. denied Little Sisters of the Poor v. California, No. 18-
1192, -- S. Ct. --, 2019 WL 1207008 (June 17, 2019) (Mem.).  
Second, based on the Agencies’ list of entities who challenged 
the Contraceptive Mandate, eight employers, not including 
Little Sisters, between New Jersey and Pennsylvania would 
likely take advantage of the Exemptions.  Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.3d 209, 224 (1st 
Cir. 2019) (relying on spreadsheet of litigating entities to find 
“it is highly likely that at least three employers in the 
Commonwealth with self-insured health plans . . . will use the 
expanded exemptions”).  Accordingly, it is not conjecture to 
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conclude that employers in Pennsylvania and New Jersey will 
take advantage of the Exemptions and, as a result, women will 
lose coverage.  Id. at 224 n.12 (stating that “it is improbable 
based on the evidence that no women in the [States] would lose 
contraceptive coverage” (emphasis omitted)). 
 
2 
 
The record also supports the District Court’s conclusion 
that the injury is imminent.  The States have provided evidence 
showing that the Exemption will result in the expenditure of 
state funds because some women who lose coverage will 
inevitably seek out state-sponsored programs providing 
contraceptive services; and some women will forego 
contraceptive use, causing the States to shoulder the costs of 
unintended pregnancies.     
 
With the ACA, many patients “switch[ed] from a 
cheaper, less effective [contraceptive] method to a more 
effective, expensive method that was better for their medical 
health and personal needs.”  App. 272.  Contraceptives are not 
only used for pregnancy prevention.  They are the “standard 
first-line of care for a number of hormonal, and other, 
disorders, including poly-cystic ovarian syndrome, primary 
ovarian insufficiency/premature ovarian failure, amenorrhea, 
dysmenorrhea/chronic pelvic pain, and abnormal uterine 
bleeding.”  App. 292.  A “vast majority” of women use inter-
uterine devices (“IUDs”)—a treatment religious objectors are 
particularly focused on, App. 350-83—“for purposes other 
than birth control.”  App. 293 (describing 90-95% of patients 
using IUDs for non-birth control purposes).  Contraceptive use 
“carries long-term health benefits for women[,]” including 
reducing the risk of ovarian and uterine cancer.  App. 294.  
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“Contraception also helps protect the health of those women 
for whom pregnancy can be hazardous, or even life-
threatening.”  Amici Curiae Health Prof’l Orgs. Br. at 16.  
Thus, removing cost free contraceptive coverage can have 
ramifications on women’s health beyond birth control and 
unplanned pregnancies.  
 
Without insurance to defray or eliminate the cost for the 
more-effective contraceptive methods, women will use “less 
expensive and less effective methods,”  App. 245, and both 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey “anticipate[] that women who 
lose contraceptive coverage through employer plans—whether 
the plan of their own employer or that of another family 
member—may seek contraception from other sources, 
including state-funded programs.”15  App. 299; App. 317.  
Thus, the State-funded programs will be tapped to provide 
coverage for financially eligible women whose employers 
invoke the Exemptions.  
 
Furthermore, some women who lose contraceptive 
coverage may either fail to qualify for state services or elect to 
forego the use of contraceptives altogether.  “Women who stop 
using contraception are more likely to have unplanned 
pregnancies and to require additional medical attention.”  App. 
312.  The costs of such unintended pregnancies are often 
                                              
15 The Agencies “theorize” that some women may be 
able to pay out of pocket or obtain coverage through a spouse 
or family member’s plan.  Massachusetts, 923 F.3d at 227.  
While “[s]uch a hypothetical woman may exist, . . .  the 
number of women with incomes that make them eligible for 
state-assisted contraceptive coverage but who still fit in that 
category would, logically, be very small.”  Id. 
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shouldered by states, costing hundreds of millions of dollars.   
Therefore, the evidence supports the conclusion that the loss of 
contraceptive coverage may also result in unintended 
pregnancies for which the States will bear associated health 
care costs. 
 
For these reasons, “[t]he expanded exemptions are 
expected to result in greater financial expenditures” by the 
States on contraceptive services.  App. 318.  This anticipated 
substantial impact on state finances presents an imminent 
injury.  Thus, the District Court properly found that the States 
showed an imminent injury in fact.   
 
The Government faults the States for failing to identify 
a specific woman who will be affected by the Final Rules, but 
the States need not define injury with such a demanding level 
of particularity to establish standing.  Massachusetts v. EPA, 
549 U.S. 497, 523 n.21 (2007); see Massachusetts, 923 F.3d at 
225; California II, 911 F.3d at 572.  The likelihood that 
employers will invoke the Exemptions and leave women 
without contraceptive coverage, and that women will turn to 
the States for coverage, is sufficient to demonstrate imminent 
injury.  This likelihood “has nothing to do with whether 
petitioners have determined [a] precise” woman who will seek 
such funding.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 n.21.16 
                                              
16 In the context of an environmental case and a claim 
that the plaintiff-state Massachusetts lacked standing because 
it failed to identify land that would be impacted by federal 
regulators’ inaction, the Supreme Court observed that 
 
the likelihood that Massachusetts’ coastline will 
recede has nothing to do with whether petitioners 
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B 
 
The States’ imminent injury is causally connected and 
fairly traceable to the Exemptions.  The States will suffer 
financial injury when employers in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey take advantage of the Exemptions, leaving female 
employees without contraceptive coverage and prompting 
financially eligible women to turn to state-funded services.  
See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 159 (5th Cir. 2015) 
(“For Texas to incur injury, DAPA beneficiaries would have to 
apply for driver’s licenses as a consequence of DHS’s action, 
and it is apparent that many would do so.”), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) 
(Mem.) (per curiam).  In other words, the States will not 
experience an increased demand for services and the resulting 
financial burden unless the new Exemptions, which create a 
void in contraceptive coverage, go into effect.  See id. at 160 
(“Far from playing an insignificant role, DAPA would be the 
                                              
have determined the precise metes and bounds of 
their soon-to-be-flooded land.  Petitioners 
maintain that the seas are rising and will continue 
to rise, and have alleged that such a rise will lead 
to the loss of Massachusetts’ sovereign 
territory.  . . . Our cases require nothing more.  
 
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523 n.21.  Just as it was 
unnecessary for Massachusetts to identify specific coastline 
that would be flooded by the agencies’ inaction, it is 
unnecessary for the States to identify a specific woman who 
would be impacted by the Government’s action where in both 
instances, the record provided a basis to infer specific 
imminent injury. 
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primary cause and likely the only one.  Without the program, 
there would be little risk of a dramatic increase in the costs of 
the driver’s-license program.”).  Thus, there is a link between 
the Exemptions and the impact on the States’ fiscs.  
 
C 
 
The District Court also correctly concluded that an 
injunction would redress the financial injury the States face 
from the Rules.  Enjoining the Final Rules until their legality 
is adjudicated on the merits will avoid the imminent financial 
burden the States face if they are not enjoined.  Massachusetts, 
923 F.3d at 228 (“[A]n injunction preventing the application of 
these exemptions would stop the alleged fiscal injury from 
occurring, making it not only ‘likely,’ Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1547, but certain that this injury would not occur for as long as 
the exemptions are enjoined.”); see Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 
526 (“The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is 
nevertheless real.  That risk would be reduced to some extent 
if petitioners received the relief they seek.”).   
 
For these reasons, the States have standing to bring this 
suit.17   
 
III 
 
Having determined that the States have standing, we 
now address whether they are entitled to a preliminary 
injunction.  The decision to grant or deny a preliminary 
                                              
17 Based upon of the foregoing discussion, we need not 
decide whether the States also have standing under the special 
solicitude or parens patriae doctrines.   
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injunction is within the sound discretion of the district court.18  
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24, 33 
(2008).  To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movants must: 
 
demonstrate (1) that they are reasonably likely to 
prevail eventually in the litigation and (2) that 
they are likely to suffer irreparable injury 
without relief.  If these two threshold showings 
are made the District Court then considers, to the 
extent relevant, (3) whether an injunction would 
harm the [defendants] more than denying relief 
would harm the plaintiffs and (4) whether 
granting relief would serve the public interest. 
 
K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 
105 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Tenafly 
Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 157 (3d Cir. 
2002)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.  To establish a likelihood of 
success, “a sufficient degree of success for a strong showing 
exists if there is ‘a reasonable chance, or probability, of 
winning.’”  In re Revel AC, Inc., 802 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Singer Mgmt. Consultants, Inc. v. Milgram, 
650 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)).   
                                              
18 “We employ a tripartite standard of review 
for . . . preliminary injunctions.  We review the District 
Court’s findings of fact for clear error.  Legal conclusions are 
assessed de novo.  The ultimate decision to grant or deny the 
injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”  K.A. ex rel. 
Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 99, 105 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (omission in original) (internal quotation marks 
and citations omitted). 
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Here, we must decide whether the District Court 
correctly concluded that the States have a reasonable 
probability of showing that the Final Rules violate the APA, 
and if so, whether the equitable factors warrant a nationwide 
injunction.  
 
A19 
 
 To promulgate binding regulations, agencies engage in 
what is known as notice-and-comment rulemaking.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 553.  This requires an agency to publish notice of the 
proposed rule in the Federal Register, collect and consider 
public comments, and issue a concise statement of purpose 
upon finalizing the new rule.  Id. § 553(b)-(c).  Deviation from 
these procedures is only permitted where expressly authorized 
by statute, id. § 559, or when the agency has “good cause” to 
dispense with them, id. § 553(b)(3)(B).  The Agencies assert 
that both grounds justify their decision to forego notice-and-
comment procedures here.  They are mistaken. 
 
1 
 
The Government first argues that provisions within the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(“HIPAA”) grant the Agencies discretion to proceed by IFR in 
lieu of notice-and-comment rulemaking.  The provisions upon 
which the Government relies provide: 
                                              
19 Quite appropriately, the Agencies do not challenge 
the States’ statutory standing to sue under the APA.  5 U.S.C. 
§ 702; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520 (recognizing states’ 
“procedural right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking 
petition as arbitrary and capricious” under the EPA).   
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The Secretary, consistent with section 104 of 
[HIPAA], may promulgate such regulations as 
may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the 
provisions of this [subchapter].  The Secretary 
may promulgate any interim final rules as the 
Secretary determines are appropriate to carry out 
this [subchapter]. 
26 U.S.C. § 9833; 29 U.S.C. § 1191c; 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92 
[hereinafter “Regulation Provision”].  This language does not 
eliminate the need for notice and comment.     
 
First, the APA only allows a subsequent statute to 
modify or supersede its procedural requirements “to the extent 
[the statute] does so expressly.”  5 U.S.C. § 559.  The 
Regulation Provision contains no express language 
supplanting APA procedures, and the sole reference to “interim 
final rules” does not confer a license to ignore APA 
requirements.  Indeed, in contrast to statutory authorizations to 
forego APA procedures, the Regulation Provision is 
“permissive (‘The Secretary may promulgate any interim final 
rules as the Secretary determines are appropriate . . .’), wide-
ranging (applying to any regulatory proceeding relating to 
group health insurance plans), and do[es] not contain any 
specific deadlines for agency action.”  Coal. for Parity, Inc. v. 
Sebelius, 709 F. Supp. 2d 10, 18-19 (D.D.C. 2010) (omissions 
in original and emphasis omitted); see also California II, 911 
F.3d at 578-80.  In short, because the Regulation Provision 
“neither contain[s] express language exempting agencies from 
the APA nor provide[s] alternative procedures that could 
reasonably be understood as departing from the APA,” it does 
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not authorize the Agencies to disregard the notice-and-
comment requirements.  California II, 911 F.3d at 579.   
 
Second, the statutory reference within the Regulation 
Provision sheds light on the scope and purpose of its IFR 
sentence.  As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit points 
out, § 104 of HIPAA aims to assure regulatory coordination 
between the Agencies’ Secretaries for matters over which they 
share responsibility.  See California II, 911 F.3d at 579-80 
(citing Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-92)).  The first sentence of the Regulation 
Provision authorizes each Secretary to promulgate regulations 
“consistent with” the HIPAA section on coordination.  The 
second sentence is identical but for two differences: it 
discusses IFRs instead of final regulations, and it omits any 
mention of HIPAA’s coordination section.  Read in light of the 
first sentence, the second ensures that each Agency can 
proceed by IFR where a Secretary “need[s] to regulate within 
his or her own domain temporarily while sorting out . . . inter-
agency conflict.”  Id. at 579.  Thus, “we need not give the 
second sentence the [A]gencies’ expansive interpretation in 
order for the second sentence to retain independent effect.”  Id. 
at 579-80.  In sum, the Regulation Provision does not expressly 
excuse the Agencies from complying with APA procedures 
and therefore does not provide a basis for issuing the IFRs 
without notice and comment.20 
                                              
20 Congress knows how to excuse an agency from 
complying with the APA.  For example, one HIPAA 
provision expressly permits the Agencies to promulgate a rule 
prior to notice and comment.  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b 
note.  That provision requires the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to publish a rule prescribing penalties for 
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2 
 
The Agencies also lacked good cause for dispensing 
with notice of and comment to the IFRs.  An agency has “good 
cause” to forego APA procedures where following them would 
be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”21  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).  “[C]ircumstances 
justifying reliance on [the good cause] exception are indeed 
rare and will be accepted only after the court has examine[d] 
closely proffered rationales justifying the elimination of public 
procedures.”  Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA (“NRDC”), 
                                              
kickbacks by January 1, 1997, then less than four months 
away.  It provides that “[s]uch rule shall be effective and final 
immediately on an interim basis, but is subject to change and 
revision after public notice and opportunity for . . . public 
comment.”  Unlike the Regulation Provision, § 1320a-7b 
expressly provides for notice and comment after the 
promulgation of an IFR.  Congress’s omission of that 
procedure from the Regulation Provision demonstrates that it 
did not provide the Agencies authority to promulgate IFRs 
without notice and comment. 
21 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) provides 
 
[e]xcept when notice or hearing is required by 
statute, this subsection does not apply— 
. . .  
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and 
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of 
reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice 
and public procedure thereon are impracticable, 
unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.  
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683 F.2d 752, 764 (3d Cir. 1982) (alterations in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Thus, we 
construe the “good cause” exception to the notice-and-
comment requirement narrowly.22  Id. 
 
When they issued the IFRs, the Agencies claimed good 
cause to waive notice and comment based on (1) the urgent 
need to alleviate harm to those with religious objections to the 
current regulations; (2) the need to address “continued 
uncertainty, inconsistency, and cost” arising from “litigation 
challenging the previous rules”; and (3) the fact that the 
Agencies had already collected comments on prior Mandate-
related regulations.  82 Fed. Reg. at 47,813-15; see also 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 47,855-59.  None of these assertions meet the standard 
for good cause. 
 
First, the Agencies’ desire to address the purported 
harm to religious objections does not ameliorate the need to 
follow appropriate procedures.  All regulations are directed 
toward reducing harm in some manner.23  See United States v. 
                                              
22 Though the review standard for agency assertions of 
good cause remains an open question in our circuit, see 
United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2013), 
we need not answer that question here.  Even applying the 
most deferential of the potential standards—reviewing the 
agency’s good cause determination to see if it is arbitrary and 
capricious—the IFRs cannot stand. 
23 As we observed in Reynolds, 
 
[m]ost, if not all, laws passed by Congress 
requiring agencies to promulgate new rules are 
designed to eliminate some real or perceived 
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Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 512-13 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, “[a] 
need to regulate affected parties does not create the urgency 
necessary to establish good cause.”  Id. at 511.  “As with any 
other administrative agency conclusion, we require some 
statement of facts or circumstances that justifies the existence 
of good cause (e.g., an imminent, externally imposed deadline 
or the existence of an emergency).”  Id. at 512.  The Agencies 
fail to cite any facts or impending deadlines sufficient to raise 
“good cause” here. 
 
Second, the need to address uncertainty is likewise 
insufficient to establish good cause.  Uncertainty precedes 
every regulation, and to allow uncertainty to excuse 
compliance with notice-and-comment procedures “would have 
the effect of writing [those] requirements out of the statute.”  
Id. at 510.  Furthermore, our precedent forecloses the 
acceptance of uncertainty as a basis for good cause.  Id. (“An 
agency’s intention to provide clarity, without more, cannot 
amount to good cause.”).    
 
Third, the Agencies’ previous solicitation and collection 
of comments regarding other rules concerning the 
                                              
harm.  If the mere assertion that such harm will 
continue while an agency gives notice and 
receives comments were enough to establish 
good cause, then notice and comment would 
always have to give way.  An agency will 
invariably be able to point to some continuing 
harm during the notice and comment period 
antecedent to the promulgation of a rule. 
 
710 F.3d at 512-13. 
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Contraceptive Mandate cannot substitute for notice and 
comment here.  If the APA permitted agencies to forego notice-
and-comment concerning a proposed regulation simply 
because they already regulated similar matters, then the good 
cause exception could largely obviate the notice-and-comment 
requirement.  Furthermore, the IFRs did not make a minor 
change.  The IFRs create exemptions from the Contraceptive 
Mandate with unprecedented scope and make the 
Accommodation wholly voluntary.  Such a dramatic overhaul 
of the Contraceptive Mandate regulations required notice-and-
comment under the APA.   
 
For these reasons, the Agencies did not have good cause 
to ignore the APA’s notice and comment requirement. 
 
B 
 
The Government also contends that, even if the IFRs 
were procedurally deficient, the Agencies’ subsequent use of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking to finalize the Rules cured 
any procedural defects.  Under our precedent, however, “post-
promulgation notice and comment procedures cannot cure the 
failure to provide such procedures prior to the promulgation of 
the rule at issue.”  NRDC, 683 F.2d at 768; see Reynolds, 710 
F.3d at 519 (“Any suggestion that the postpromulgation 
comments to the Interim Rule can satisfy [the purposes of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking] misses the point.” (internal 
citation omitted)); Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 
381 (3d Cir. 1979) (“We hold that the period for comments 
after promulgation cannot substitute for the prior notice and 
comment required by the APA.”).  
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APA notice-and-comment procedures serve several 
goals, including “(1) to ensure that agency regulations are 
tested via exposure to diverse public comment, (2) to ensure 
fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an 
opportunity to develop evidence in the record to support their 
objections to the rule and thereby enhance the quality of 
judicial review.”  Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 
431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 
1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).  The comment process also 
allows each agency to “maintain[] a flexible and open-minded 
attitude towards its own rules,” Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 511 
(alteration in original and citation omitted) (quoting 
Prometheus Radio, 652 F.3d at 449); see also Azar v. Allina 
Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1816 (2019) (“Notice and 
comment . . .affords the agency a chance to avoid errors and 
make a more informed decision.” (internal citation omitted)).  
To preserve the integrity of this process, “[t]he opportunity for 
comment must be a meaningful opportunity,” Prometheus 
Radio, 652 F.3d at 450 (alteration in original), to have 
interested parties share their views, and to have the agency 
consider them with an “open mind,” Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 
517-19.   
 
The notice and comment exercise surrounding the Final 
Rules does not reflect any real open-mindedness toward the 
position set forth in the IFRs.24  First, as the Government 
admits, the minor changes to the Final Rules do not “alter the 
                                              
24 We express no opinion on whether the Agencies 
appropriately responded to comments collected during this 
process, see Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 811-12, as this issue is 
not before us. 
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fundamental substance of the exemptions set forth in the 
IFRs.”  Dkt. 107-1 at 8.  Second, the reasons the Agencies 
supplied for promulgating the Final Rules simply echoed those 
provided for issuing the IFRs.  See 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,552, 
57,609.  These rationales do not show the “flexible and open-
minded attitude” the notice-and-comment process requires.  
Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 511.  Together, the Agencies’ 
justifications for avoiding notice and comment to the IFRs, and 
the fact that the IFRs and the Final Rules are virtually identical, 
suggest that the opportunity for comment was not a 
“meaningful” one in the way the APA requires.  Prometheus 
Radio, 652 F.3d at 450. 
 
Lastly, even setting aside the Agencies’ lack of open-
mindedness, the IFRs also impaired the rulemaking process by 
altering the Agencies’ starting point in considering the Final 
Rules.  In NRDC, our Court rejected the EPA’s argument that 
the opportunity for post-promulgation comment remedied the 
EPA’s initial failure to promulgate a rule through notice-and-
comment rulemaking:     
 
[t]o allow the APA procedures in connection 
with the [new rule] to substitute for APA 
procedures in connection with [the initial, 
procedurally defective rule] would allow [the] 
EPA to substitute post-promulgation notice and 
comment procedures for pre-promulgation 
notice and comment procedures at any time by 
taking an action without complying with the 
APA, and then establishing a notice and 
comment procedure on the question of whether 
that action should be continued.  This would 
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allow agencies to circumvent [our case law] and 
the APA.  We cannot countenance such a result. 
683 F.2d at 768 (citation omitted).  This reasoning applies with 
equal force here.  By first promulgating the IFRs that granted 
the expanded exemptions without notice and comment, the 
Agencies changed the question presented concerning the Final 
Rules from whether they should create the exemptions to 
whether they should depart from them.     This starting position 
is impermissible under the APA.  Id.; see also Sharon Steel, 
597 F.2d at 381 (“Provision of prior notice and comment 
allows effective participation in the rulemaking process while 
the decisionmaker is still receptive to information and 
argument.  After the final rule is issued, the petitioner must 
come hat-in-hand and run the risk that the decisionmaker is 
likely to resist change.” (citation omitted)).  
 
 In sum, because deficits in the promulgation of the IFRs 
compromised the procedural integrity of the Final Rules, the 
States have demonstrated a likelihood of success in showing 
that the Final Rules are procedurally defective, and in turn, 
violate the APA.   
C 
 
There are also serious substantive problems with the 
Final Rules.  More specifically, neither of the statutes upon 
which the Agencies rely, the ACA and RFRA, authorize or 
require the Final Rules.  Thus, they were enacted “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right,” making them “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  5 
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C).   
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1 
 
The Agencies argue that their authority under the ACA 
to issue preventive care guidelines includes the power to 
promulgate the Exemptions.  This assertion is without textual 
support.  The Women’s Health Amendment to the ACA, 42 
U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4), provides: 
 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer 
offering group or individual health insurance 
coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage 
for and shall not impose any cost sharing 
requirements for— . . .  
(3) with respect to infants, children, and 
adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care 
and screenings provided for in the 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
[HRSA]. 
(4) with respect to women, such additional 
preventive care and screenings not described in 
paragraph (1)[25] as provided for in 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the 
[HRSA] for purposes of this paragraph. 
42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a).  The authority to issue 
“comprehensive guidelines” concerns the type of services that 
are to be provided and does not provide authority to undermine 
                                              
25 Paragraph (1) refers to “evidence-based items or 
services that have in effect a rating of ‘A’ or ‘B’ in the current 
recommendations of the United States Preventive Services 
Task Force.”  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1).  
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Congress’s directive concerning who must provide coverage 
for these services.   Section 300gg-13(a) unambiguously 
dictates that group health plans and health insurance issuers 
“shall provide” the preventive care services set forth in the 
HRSA-supported comprehensive guidelines, and “shall” not 
impose cost sharing.  The term “shall” denotes a requirement, 
Prometheus Radio Proj. v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 50 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Th[e] repeated use of ‘shall’ creates ‘an obligation 
impervious to . . . discretion.’” (omission in original) (quoting 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 
U.S. 26, 35 (1998)), and HRSA’s authority to issue the 
guidelines does not empower it to ignore that requirement.  
Nothing from § 300gg-13(a) gives HRSA the discretion to 
wholly exempt actors of its choosing from providing the 
guidelines services.  On the contrary, the mandate articulated 
in § 300gg-13(a) forecloses such exemptions.26       
                                              
26 The Government argues that if the ACA does not 
grant the authority to issue the Exemptions, then HRSA was 
equally without authority to issue the Church Exemption and 
the Accommodation.  This argument fails.  Though the 
Church Exemption may seem facially at odds with § 300gg-
13(a), Supreme Court precedent dictates a narrow form of 
exemption for houses of worship.  See 80 Fed. Reg. at 41,325 
(describing the exemption for churches and houses of worship 
as “consistent with their special status under longstanding 
tradition in our society and under federal law”); see, e.g., 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. 
EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (discussing the existence of a 
ministerial exception precluding application of employment 
legislation to a religious institution to respect churches’ 
internal autonomy).   The Accommodation likewise does not 
plainly run afoul of the ACA.  Instead, it provides a process 
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 The Agencies’ reliance on the language that directed 
HRSA to create the guidelines concerning women’s preventive 
health care and the use of the phrase “as provided for in” such 
guidelines does not advance their position.  The Agencies 
contrast § 300gg-13(a)(4)’s use of the phrase “as provided for 
in” comprehensive guidelines with a neighboring sub-section’s 
provision addressing preventive care for infants, children, and 
adolescents, which is “provided for in the” comprehensive 
guidelines for those services.  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13(a)(3) (describing “preventive care and screenings provided 
for in the comprehensive guidelines”), with id. § 300gg-
13(a)(4) (describing “preventive care and screenings as 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines”).  They assert that 
the use of the word “as” in § 300gg-13(a)(4) gives HRSA 
authority to dictate the preventive services to be provided and 
who must provide them.  This argument overlooks the clear 
explanation for the different language.  When the ACA was 
passed, the comprehensive guidelines for children’s preventive 
care already existed, but guidelines for women’s preventive 
care were not yet written.  Congress used the definite article 
“the” in § 300gg-13(a)(3) to refer to those existing children’s 
preventive care guidelines.  In § 300gg-13(a)(4), Congress 
addressed the women’s preventive care guidelines that were 
yet to be promulgated by stating “as provided for in the 
comprehensive guidelines.”  
 
 The Agencies’ interpretation of “comprehensive” as 
authorizing them to issue guidelines that exempt entities from 
                                              
through which a statutorily identified actor “shall provide” 
the mandated coverage.  In any event, the Agencies’ authority 
to issue the Church Exemption and Accommodation is not 
before us.   
45 
 
complying with the Mandate likewise fails.  Put simply, the 
discretion the statute grants HRSA to issue comprehensive 
guidelines concerning services to be provided does not include 
the power to exempt actors from the statute itself.  This is borne 
out by the fact that the word “comprehensive” is also used to 
describe the children’s preventive care guidelines, and those 
guidelines do not exempt any statutorily required party from 
providing services.  See HHS, Preventive Care Benefits for 
Children, https://www.healthcare.gov/preventive-care-
children (last visited May 8, 2019).  Congress was obviously 
aware of the existing children’s guidelines when it drafted the 
Women’s Health Amendment, and Congress’s use of 
“comprehensive” to describe both sets of guidelines conveys 
that it intended them to cover the same type of subject matter, 
namely health care services for the identified groups.  See 
F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 292 (2012) (“[W]hen 
Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and 
adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed 
word in the body of learning from which it was taken.” 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 
 Other portions of the ACA also show that Congress 
retained the authority to exempt certain employers from 
providing contraceptive coverage.  In passing the ACA, 
Congress explicitly exempted grandfathered plans from the 
Contraceptive Mandate and other ACA requirements.  42 
U.S.C. § 18011(a), (e).  Congress also considered and rejected 
a statutory conscience amendment that would have operated 
similarly to the challenged Exemptions.  158 Cong. Rec. 
S1162, 1173-74 (2012).  Between the substantially analogous 
exemption Congress rejected, and the one it decided to keep, 
Congress demonstrated that exempting specific actors from the 
ACA’s mandatory requirements is its job, not the Agencies.  
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See United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 58 (2000) (“When 
Congress provides exceptions in a statute,” we may infer “that 
Congress considered the issue of exceptions and, in the end, 
limited the statute to the ones set forth.”).  Relatedly, by 
promulgating the Moral Exemption, which sought to do what  
Congress refused to do with the conscience amendment, the 
Agencies contravened Congress’s intent.  See Food & Drug 
Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
147 (2000) (considering Congress’s prior refusal to pass laws 
as material to whether an agency’s interpretation of its statute 
is entitled to deference).  
 
 Because § 300gg-13(a) does not authorize the Agencies 
to exempt plans from providing the required coverage, the 
Agencies’ authority under the ACA to enact the Final Rules is 
without merit.     
 
227 
 
The Agencies’ effort to cast RFRA as requiring the 
Religious Exemption is also incorrect.  Even assuming that 
RFRA provides statutory authority for the Agencies to issue 
regulations to address religious burdens the Contraceptive 
Mandate may impose on certain individuals, RFRA does not 
require the enactment of the Religious Exemption to address 
this burden.     
 
RFRA provides that the federal government “[s]hall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” 42 U.S.C. 
                                              
27 No party argues that RFRA authorizes or requires 
the Moral Exemption.   
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§ 2000bb-1(a), unless “that application of the burden to the 
person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest,” id. § 2000bb-1(b).  “[A] 
person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation 
of this section” may seek relief in a judicial proceeding.  Id. 
§ 2000bb-1(c).  Thus, RFRA authorizes a cause of action for 
government actions that impose a substantial burden on a 
person’s sincerely-held religious beliefs, and provides a 
judicial remedy via individualized adjudication.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000bb-3(a); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 
(1997) (“[RFRA] prevents and remedies laws which are 
enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious 
beliefs and practices.”).  Because Congress has deemed the 
courts the adjudicator of private rights of actions under RFRA, 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 
546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006) (holding RFRA “plainly 
contemplates that courts would . . . consider whether 
exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress” 
(emphasis omitted)), we owe the Agencies no deference when 
reviewing determinations based upon RFRA, see Adams Fruit 
Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990) (declining to 
defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation where Congress 
“expressly established the Judiciary and not the [agency] as the 
adjudicator of private rights of action arising under the 
statute”).   
 
A prima facie RFRA case requires a plaintiff to prove 
that the government imposed a substantial burden on religious 
exercise.  Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2016).  A substantial burden exists if 
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(1) a follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and 
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available 
to other [persons] versus abandoning one of the 
precepts of his religion in order to receive a 
benefit; or (2) the government puts substantial 
pressure on an adherent to substantially modify 
his behavior and to violate his beliefs.[28] 
  
Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 371 (3d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Supreme 
Court has directed that, when considering a requested 
accommodation to address the burden, “courts must take 
adequate account of the burdens a requested accommodation 
may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”  Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (referring to third parties who may face 
collateral consequences from accommodating an observer’s 
burden).29  The Accommodation fulfills this directive as it 
                                              
28 Although we “defer to the reasonableness” of an 
objector’s religious beliefs, “this does not bar our objective 
evaluation of the nature of the claimed burden and the 
substantiality of that burden on [the objector’s] religious 
exercise.”  Real Alternatives, Inc. v. Sec’y Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 356 (3d Cir. 2017) (emphasis 
omitted) (citation omitted).   
29 Although Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), 
dealt with an application of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), we have said that 
RLUIPA and RFRA “are analogous for the purpose of the 
substantial burden test,” and we may therefore may apply 
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provides a means for an observer to adhere to religious precepts 
and simultaneously allows women to receive statutorily-
mandated health care coverage.     
 
 RFRA does not require the broad exemption embodied 
in the Final Rule nor to make voluntary a notice of the 
employer’s decision not to provide such coverage to avoid 
burdening those beliefs.  As our Court has explained, 
 
the self-certification form does not trigger or 
facilitate the provision of contraceptive coverage 
because coverage is mandated to be otherwise 
provided by federal law. Federal law, rather than 
any involvement by the [employers] in filling out 
or submitting the self-certification form, creates 
the obligation of the insurance issuers and third-
party administrators to provide coverage for 
contraceptive services. . . .  
 
[And] the submission of the self-certification 
form does not make the [employers] “complicit” 
in the provision of contraceptive coverage. 
 
Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 437-38 (3d Cir. 2015) (emphasis 
omitted), vacated and remanded sub nom. Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 
1557.30   
                                              
RLUIPA law.  Mack, 839 F.3d at 304 n.103; see Holt v. 
Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015). 
30 While Zubik vacated our opinion in Geneva College, 
it did not reach the merits of the Accommodation nor did it 
“attack our reasoning.”  Real Alternatives, 867 F.3d at 356 
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The religious objectors who oppose the 
Accommodation mechanism disapprove of “what follows 
from” filing the self-certification form, but under Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, we examine the conduct of the objector, not 
third parties.  Id.  at 439-40.  Here, through the 
Accommodation process, “the actual provision of 
contraceptive coverage is by a third party,” so any possible 
burden from the notification procedure is not substantial.  Id. 
at 442.  For these reasons, RFRA does not require that the 
Agencies permit religious objectors to decline to provide 
contraceptive coverage without notifying their insurance 
issuer, TPA, HHS, or the employees.   
 
Contrary to the Agencies’ assertions in the Rule, the 
Supreme Court has not held that the Accommodation imposes 
substantial burdens on religious rights.  Hobby Lobby ruled 
that closely-held corporations are entitled to take advantage of 
the Accommodation process rather than facing fines for non-
compliance with the contraceptive mandate, observing that the 
Accommodation was a less restrictive alternative to forcing 
objectors to choose between adhering to the mandate or 
violating their sincerely-held beliefs.  573 U.S. at 730-31.  
While the Court “did not decide” whether the Accommodation 
“complies with RFRA,” it found that “[a]t a minimum . . . it 
does not impinge on that plaintiffs’ religious belief that 
providing insurance coverage for [certain contraceptives] 
violates their religion, and it serves HHS’s stated interests 
equally well.”  Id. at 731; see also Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1561 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The opinion does 
                                              
n.18.  After Zubik, we repeated that the Accommodation does 
“not impose a substantial burden.”  Id. 
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not . . . endorse the petitioners’ position that the existing 
regulations substantially burden their religious exercise or that 
contraceptive coverage must be provided through a separate 
policy, with a separate enrollment process.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); Wheaton, 573 U.S. at 960 
(noting that Hobby Lobby “expressly rel[ied] on the 
availability of the religious-nonprofit accommodation” to 
reach its holding).   
 
Furthermore, the Religious Exemption and the new 
optional Accommodation would impose an undue burden on 
nonbeneficiaries—the female employees who will lose 
coverage for contraceptive care.  The Agencies downplayed 
this burden on women, contradicting Congress’s mandate that 
women be provided contraceptive coverage.  “No tradition, 
and no prior decision under RFRA, allows a religion-based 
exemption when the [A]ccommodation would be harmful to 
others—here, the very persons the contraceptive coverage 
requirement was designed to protect.” Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 
at 764 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  As the Agencies recognize, 
the record shows that thousands of women may lose 
contraceptive coverage if the Rule is enforced and frustrate 
their right to obtain contraceptives.  Id. at 727 (citation 
omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (directing the enactment 
of the Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, which include 
contraceptives).   
 
In short, the status quo prior to the new Rule, with the 
Accommodation, did not infringe on the religious exercise of 
covered employers, nor is there a basis to conclude the 
Accommodation process infringes on the religious exercise of 
any employer.  For these reasons, RFRA does not demand the 
Religious Exemption. 
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D 
 
Because the States demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on the merits as to their APA claim, we next turn to the 
remaining equitable factors.  To obtain a preliminary 
injunction, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that irreparable injury 
is likely in the absence of an injunction.”  Winter, 555 U.S. at 
22 (emphasis omitted).  Because the States cannot collect 
money damages under the APA,31 5 U.S.C. § 702 (enabling 
claimants to obtain “relief other than money damages”); see 
also California II, 911 F.3d at 581, the States will suffer 
irreparable harm if the Rules are enforced.  The States will face 
unredressable financial consequences from subsidizing 
contraceptive services, providing funds for medical care 
associated with unintended pregnancies, and absorbing 
medical expenses that arise from decreased use of 
contraceptive medications for other health conditions.   
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
holding that the States demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable 
harm. 
 
Furthermore, because the current Accommodation does 
not substantially burden employers’ religious exercise and the 
Exemption is not necessary to protect a legally-cognizable 
interest, the States’ financial injury outweighs any purported 
injury to religious exercise.  Moreover, the public interest 
favors minimizing harm to third-parties by ensuring that 
women who may lose ACA guaranteed contraceptive coverage 
                                              
31 Monetary injuries ordinarily do not constitute 
irreparable harm because they are compensable.  See Instant 
Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 
(3d Cir. 1989).    
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are able to maintain access to the preventive care to which they 
are entitled under the ACA and HRSA’s comprehensive 
guidelines while final adjudication of the Rules is pending.  
Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the balance of the equities and the public 
interest both favor issuing an injunction.   
 
E 
 
Having determined that a preliminary injunction is 
warranted, the final question we address is whether the District 
Court abused its discretion by enjoining the Final Rules 
nationwide.  “Crafting a preliminary injunction is an exercise 
of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the 
equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues it 
presents.”  Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. 
Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam).  While courts are vested 
with the power to issue equitable relief with a nationwide 
reach, see Texas, 809 F.3d at 188 (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, 
§ 1), they must ensure that “injunctive relief [is] no more 
burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to plaintiffs,” Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. 
v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 
578, 598 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  We must also bear in mind that the purpose of 
injunctions is “not to conclusively determine the rights of the 
parties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves 
forward.”  Trump, 137 S. Ct. at 2087 (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
Mindful of these considerations, the District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that a nationwide 
injunction is necessary to afford complete relief to the States 
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and that it is not “more burdensome to the defendant than 
necessary” to provide such relief.32  Groupe SEB USA, Inc. v. 
Euro-Pro Operating LLC, 774 F.3d 192, 206 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  First, our 
APA case law suggests that, at the merits stage, courts 
invalidate—without qualification—unlawful administrative 
rules as a matter of course, leaving their predecessors in place 
until the agencies can take further action.  See, e.g., 
Prometheus Radio, 652 F.3d at 453-54 & n.25 (vacating 
procedurally defective rule and leaving the prior rule in effect); 
Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 258 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (same).  Congress determined that rule-vacatur was 
not unnecessarily burdensome on agencies when it provided 
vacatur as a standard remedy for APA violations.  See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2) (“The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action” that is outside an agency’s authority, or 
“without observance of procedure required by law,” among 
other things).  While vacatur is the ultimate remedy the States 
seek, and that is not the relief being granted here, by enjoining 
enforcement of the Rules we provide a basis to ensure that a 
regulation that the States have shown likely to be proven to be 
unlawful is not effective until its validity is finally adjudicated.    
  
Second, a nationwide injunction is necessary to provide 
the States complete relief.  Many individuals work in a state 
that is different from the one in which they reside.  See Amici 
                                              
32 Our sister circuit declined to uphold a nationwide 
injunction concerning the IFRs, but the record before us is 
substantially more developed than the record before that 
court.  California II, 911 F.3d at 584 (“On the present record, 
an injunction that applies only to the plaintiff states would 
provide complete relief to them.”).    
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Curiae Massachusetts, et al., Br. at 24 (“Mass. Amici Br.”) 
(stating that 14% of the workforce in New Jersey and 5.4% in 
Pennsylvania work out of state, comprising more than 800,000 
workers in total).  An injunction geographically limited to the 
States alone will not protect them from financial harm, as some 
share of their residents who work out-of-state will lose 
contraceptive coverage originally provided through employers 
in non-enjoined states who will exempt themselves.  Women 
covered by these plans who live in the States will seek state-
funded services, and a state specific injunction will not be 
sufficient to prevent the resulting financial harm.  
 
  Out-of-state college attendance further exacerbates the 
States’ injury.  As the Moral Exemption points out, “[o]nly a 
minority of students in higher education receive health 
insurance coverage from plans arranged by their colleges or 
universities.”  83 Fed. Reg. at 57,564; 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,619.  
Instead, most of these students remain on their parents’ 
employer-based plans.  Mass. Amici Br. at 26.  The States host 
many such students at their colleges.  “Each year, for example, 
Pennsylvania takes in more than 32,000 first-time out-of-state 
students alone—the second most of any state in the country.”  
Mass. Amici Br. at 25 (citing Nat’l Ctr. For Educ. Statistics, 
Residence and Migration of All First-Time Degree/Certificate-
Seeking Undergraduates, Digest of Education Statistics 
(2017)).  In the absence of a nationwide injunction, students 
attending school in the States may lose contraceptive coverage 
from their parents’ out-of-state plans, again leaving programs 
within the States to pick up the bill.33  In light of the impact of 
                                              
33 It is also likely that residents of the States will attend 
out-of-state schools that invoke the Exemptions, and that such 
students will seek contraceptive services through programs in 
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these interstate activities, the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in concluding that a nationwide injunction was 
necessary to afford the States complete relief.34     
 
V 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting the nationwide preliminary injunction. 
                                              
their home states, also giving rise to fiscal injuries to the 
States that only a nationwide injunction can remedy. 
34 The Government also argues that a nationwide 
injunction takes a toll on the court system, foreclosing 
“adjudication by a number of different courts and judges,” 
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979), thereby 
preventing legal questions from “percolating” throughout the 
court system, Gov’t Br. at 79-80.  The argument has little 
force in this case.  First, other federal courts have examined 
substantially the same legal issues as we confront here.  See 
generally Massachusetts, 923 F.3d 209; California II, 911 
F.3d 558.  Second, the extensive litigation surrounding the 
Exemption and Accommodation have allowed for an airing of 
the legal issues.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, The 
Little Sisters of the Poor Jeanne Jugan Residence v. 
California (No. 18-1192) (“Further percolation is 
unnecessary. . . . [T]his issue was adjudicated by ten courts of 
appeals and dozens of district courts. . . . The arguments have 
all been aired.”).  Thus, there is no “percolation” problem 
here.   
